United Nations S/2017/673

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 August 2017
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 3 August 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to transmit to you two statistical tables (see annex) that set out the following:

- Initial estimates of the losses resulting from attacks carried out by the so-called international coalition against oil and gas facilities in the Syrian Arab Republic in the period from 1 April 2017 to 15 July 2017.
- Initial estimates of the overall losses resulting from attacks carried out by the so-called international coalition against oil and gas facilities in the Syrian Arab Republic from 23 September 2014, the date on which that coalition began its unlawful military operations, to 15 July 2017.

My country's Government has informed the Council on numerous occasions that the repeated bombings being carried out by the warplanes of the so-called international coalition led by the United States of America continue to cause significant damage and the near-total destruction of Syrian oil and gas installations. These repeated bombings are part of a deliberate and systematic operation to destroy oil and gas facilities, sites and infrastructure in the Syrian Arab Republic.

The aerial bombardment carried out by aircraft of the so-called coalition under the pretext of countering terrorism continues to take the lives of innocent Syrian civilians, destroy infrastructure and installations and cause enormous financial losses, in excess of tens of billions of dollars, to the Syrian economy. The bombings have also cut off or limited the access of Syrian civilians to a number of services, most notably power, heating, transportation, food and medicine.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic once again calls on the Security Council to fulfil its responsibilities and condemn these systematic acts of destruction and put an end to the damage and destruction being caused by this coalition. The Government stresses that any international efforts aimed at countering terrorism must, in the first place, respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, and that such efforts must be carried out in full cooperation with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and in full compliance with the relevant Security Council resolution, particularly resolution 2253 (2015). It furthermore stresses that the Governments of the States members of the illegitimate coalition will bear the political, moral, legal and material responsibility for the systematic acts of destruction and killing that are

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committed by its military forces operating in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic within the framework of that illegitimate coalition.

I should be grateful if the present letter and the annexed tables could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex to the identical letters dated 3 August 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Tables of initial estimates of cumulative damages resulting from the bombing by the air force of the so-called Western coalition of oil and gas installations from 23 September 2014 to 15 July 2017

Amount of damages to active and other associated companies assessed recently for the period from 1 April 2017 to 15 July 2017

				Amount of losses (United States dollars)		
Company	*Date*	*Location bombed*	*Losses and damage sustained*	*Direct*	*Indirect losses (from burning of oil and gas)*	*Total*
Furat Petroleum Company	23 April 2017	Main station at the Umar field	The bombing resulted in the destruction of oil export tanks T-317 and T-321; the capacity of each tank is approximately 75,000 barrels.	10 800 000	–	10 800 000
Total losses				**10 800 000**	**–**	**10 800 000**

Cumulative damages assessed from the start of the bombings on 23 September 2014 to 15 July 2017

	Amount of losses (United States dollars)		
Initial estimates of losses sustained at the oil and gas installations of all companies in the Syrian Arab Republic as result of the bombings carried out by the air force of the so-called Western coalition, estimated from the onset of the bombings to 15 July 2017	*Direct*	*Indirect (from production delays or burning of oil and gas)*	*Total*
In 2014	521 330 048	22 280 985	543 611 033
In 2015	1 015 001 533	112 256 257	1 127 257 790
In 2016	125 554 200	45 507	125 599 707
In 2017	720 449 912	–	720 449 912
Total	**2 382 335 693**	**134 582 749**	**2 516 918 442**
Grand total		**2 516 918 442**	

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United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009), resolution 2087 (2013), resolution 2094 (2013), resolution 2270 (2016), resolution 2321 (2016), and resolution 2356 (2017), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13),

Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Expressing its gravest concern at the July 3 and July 28 of 2017 ballistic missile tests by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("the DPRK"), which the DPRK has stated were tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles, in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), and 2356 (2017), and at the challenge such tests constitute to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("the NPT") and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger they pose to peace and stability in the region and beyond,

Underlining once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community,

Underlining also that measures imposed by this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK,

Expressing serious concern that the DPRK has continued to violate relevant Security Council resolutions through repeated launches and attempted launches of ballistic missiles, and *noting* that all such ballistic missile activities contribute to the DPRK's development of nuclear weapons delivery systems and increase tension in the region and beyond,

Expressing continued concern that the DPRK is abusing the privileges and immunities accorded under the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations,

Expressing great concern that the DPRK's prohibited arms sales have generated revenues that are diverted to the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles while DPRK citizens have unmet needs,

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Expressing its gravest concern that the DPRK's ongoing nuclear- and ballistic missile-related activities have further generated increased tension in the region and beyond, and *determining* that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. *Condemns* in the strongest terms the ballistic missile launches conducted by the DPRK on 3 July and 28 July of 2017, which the DPRK has stated were launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and which used ballistic missile technology in violation and flagrant disregard of the Security Council's resolutions;

2. *Reaffirms* its decisions that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation; shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches; shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related activities; and shall abandon any other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;

Designations

3. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I and II of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and *decides* further that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the individuals listed in Annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction;

4. *Decides* to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) and this resolution through the designation of additional goods, *directs* the Committee to undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Security Council within fifteen days of adoption of this resolution, and *further decides* that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report;

5. *Decides* to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 7 of resolution 2321 (2016) through the designation of additional conventional arms-related items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology, *directs* the Committee to undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Security Council within thirty days of adoption of this resolution, *further decides* that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report, and *directs* the Committee to update this list every 12 months;

Transportation

6. *Decides* that the Committee may designate vessels for which it has information indicating they are, or have been, related to activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), or this resolution and all Member States shall prohibit the entry into their ports of such designated vessels, unless entry is required in the case of emergency or in the case of return to its port of origination, or unless the Committee determines in advance that such entry is required for humanitarian purposes or any other purposes consistent with the objectives of resolutions 1718

(2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), or this resolution;

7. *Clarifies* that the measures set forth in paragraph 20 of resolution 2270 (2016) and paragraph 9 of resolution 2321 (2016), requiring States to prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction from owning, leasing, operating any vessel flagged by the DPRK, without exception, unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance, apply to chartering vessels flagged by the DPRK;

Sectoral

8. *Decides* that paragraph 26 of resolution 2321 (2016) shall be replaced by the following:

> "*Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, coal, iron, and iron ore, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such material from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, *decides* that for sales and transactions of iron and iron ore for which written contracts have been finalized prior to the adoption of this resolution, all States may allow those shipments to be imported into their territories up to 30 days from the date of adoption of this resolution with notification provided to the Committee containing details on those imports by no later than 45 days after the date of adoption of this resolution, and *decides* further that this provision shall not apply with respect to coal that the exporting State confirms on the basis of credible information has originated outside the DPRK and was transported through the DPRK solely for export from the Port of Rajin (Rason), provided that the exporting State notifies the Committee in advance and such transactions involving coal originating outside of the DPRK are unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), or this resolution;"

9. *Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, seafood (including fish, crustaceans, mollusks, and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms), and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, and further *decides* that for sales and transactions of seafood (including fish, crustaceans, mollusks, and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms) for which written contracts have been finalized prior to the adoption of this resolution, all States may allow those shipments to be imported into their territories up to 30 days from the date of adoption of this resolution with notification provided to the Committee containing details on those imports by no later than 45 days after the date of adoption of this resolution;

10. *Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, lead and lead ore, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, and further *decides* that for sales and transactions of lead and lead ore for which written contracts have been finalized prior to the adoption of this resolution, all States may allow those shipments to be imported into their territories up to 30 days from the date of adoption of this

resolution with notification provided to the Committee containing details on those imports by no later than 45 days after the date of adoption of this resolution;

11. *Expresses concern* that DPRK nationals frequently work in other States for the purpose of generating foreign export earnings that the DPRK uses to support its prohibited nuclear and ballistic missile programs, *decides* that all Member States shall not exceed on any date after the date of adoption of this resolution the total number of work authorizations for DPRK nationals provided in their jurisdictions at the time of the adoption of this resolution unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance that employment of additional DPRK nationals beyond the number of work authorizations provided in a member state's jurisdiction at the time of the adoption of this resolution is required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, denuclearization or any other purpose consistent with the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), or this resolution;

Financial

12. *Decides* that States shall prohibit, by their nationals or in their territories, the opening of new joint ventures or cooperative entities with DPRK entities or individuals, or the expansion of existing joint ventures through additional investments, whether or not acting for or on behalf of the government of the DPRK, unless such joint ventures or cooperative entities have been approved by the Committee in advance on a case-by-case basis;

13. *Clarifies* that the prohibitions contained in paragraph 11 of resolution 2094 (2013) apply to clearing of funds through all Member States' territories;

14. *Clarifies* that companies performing financial services commensurate with those provided by banks are considered financial institutions for the purposes of implementing paragraph 11 of resolution 2094 (2013), paragraphs 33 and 34 of resolution 2270 (2016), and paragraph 33 of resolution 2321 (2016);

Chemical Weapons

15. *Recalls* paragraph 24 of resolution 2270 (2016), *decides* that the DPRK shall not deploy or use chemical weapons, and *urgently calls upon* the DPRK to accede to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction, and then to immediately comply with its provisions;

Vienna Convention

16. *Demands* that the DPRK fully comply with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations;

Impact on the People of the DPRK

17. *Regrets* the DPRK's massive diversion of its scarce resources toward its development of nuclear weapons and a number of expensive ballistic missile programs, *notes* the findings of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance that well over half of the people in the DPRK suffer from major insecurities in food and medical care, including a very large number of pregnant and lactating women and under-five children who are at risk of malnutrition and nearly a quarter of its total population suffering from chronic malnutrition, and, in this context, *expresses* deep concern at the grave hardship to which the people in the DPRK are subjected;

Sanctions Implementation

18. *Decides* that Member States shall report to the Security Council within ninety days of the adoption of this resolution, and thereafter upon request by the Committee, on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, *requests* the Panel of Experts, in cooperation with other United Nations sanctions monitoring groups, to continue its efforts to assist Member States in preparing and submitting such reports in a timely manner;

19. *Calls upon* all Member States to redouble efforts to implement in full the measures in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), and 2356 (2017), and to cooperate with each other in doing so, particularly with respect to inspecting, detecting and seizing items the transfer of which is prohibited by these resolutions;

20. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1718 (2006), shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution and *further decides* that the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009) and modified in paragraph 1 of resolution 2345 (2017), shall also apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution;

21. *Decides* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable or unusable, storage, or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), or this resolution that are identified in inspections, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Development of 29 April 1997, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972;

22. *Emphasizes* the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), or this resolution, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions;

23. *Requests* that Interpol issue Special Notices with respect to designated individuals, and *directs* the Committee to work with Interpol to develop the appropriate arrangements to do so;

24. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide additional analytical resources needed to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) to strengthen its ability to analyze the DPRK's sanctions violation and evasion activities;

Political

25. *Reiterates* its deep concern at the grave hardship that the people in the DPRK are subjected to, *condemns* the DPRK for pursuing nuclear weapons and

ballistic missiles instead of the welfare of its people while people in the DPRK have great unmet needs, and *emphasizes* the necessity of the DPRK respecting and ensuring the welfare and inherent dignity of people in the DPRK;

26. *Reaffirms* that the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively or restrict those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, food aid and humanitarian assistance, that are not prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017) and this resolution, and the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK and *decides* that the Committee may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions if the committee determines that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of such organizations in the DPRK or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of these resolutions, and *further decides* that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall not apply with respect to financial transactions with the DPRK Foreign Trade Bank or the Korea National Insurance Corporation if such transactions are solely for the operation of diplomatic or consular missions in the DPRK or humanitarian assistance activities that are undertaken by, or in coordination with, the United Nations;

27. *Reaffirms* its support for the Six Party Talks, *calls* for their resumption, and *reiterates* its support for the commitments set forth in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States, including that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, that the United States and the DPRK undertook to respect each other's sovereignty and exist peacefully together, that the Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation, and all other relevant commitments;

28. *Reiterates* the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large, and *expresses* its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic, and political solution to the situation and welcomes efforts by the Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and stresses the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and beyond;

29. *Affirms* that it shall keep the DPRK's actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK's compliance, and, in this regard, *expresses its determination* to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK nuclear test or launch;

30. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex I

Travel Ban/Asset Freeze (Individuals)

1. CHOE CHUN YONG
   a. *Description*: Representative for Ilsim International Bank, which is affiliated with the DPRK military and has a close relationship with the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation. Ilsim International Bank has attempted to evade United Nations sanctions.
   b. *A.K.A.*: Ch'oe Ch'un-yo'ng
   c. *Identifiers*: Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 654410078; Gender: male
2. HAN JANG SU
   a. *Description*: Chief Representative of the Foreign Trade Bank.
   b. *A.K.A.*: Chang-Su Han
   c. *Identifiers*: DOB: November 08, 1969; POB: Pyongyang, DPRK; Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 745420176, expires on October 19, 2020; Gender: male
3. JANG SONG CHOL
   a. *Description*: Jang Song Chol is a Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID) representative overseas.
   b. *AKA*: n/a
   c. *Identifiers*: DOB: 12 March 1967; Nationality: DPRK
4. JANG SUNG NAM
   a. *Description*: Chief of an overseas Tangun Trading Corporation branch, which is primarily responsible for the procurement of commodities and technologies to support the DPRK's defense research and development programs.
   b. *A.K.A.*: n/a
   c. *Identifiers*: DOB: July 14, 1970; Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 563120368, issued on March 22, 2013; Passport expiration date: March 22, 2018; Gender: male
5. JO CHOL SONG
   a. *Description*: Deputy Representative for the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation, which provides financial services in support to Tanchon Commercial Bank and Korea Hyoksin Trading, a subordinate entity of Korea Ryonbong General Corporation.
   b. *A.K.A.*: Cho Ch'o'l-so'ng
   c. *Identifiers*: DOB: September 25, 1984; Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 654320502, expires on September 16, 2019; Gender: male
6. KANG CHOL SU
   a. *Description*: Official for Korea Ryonbong General Corporation, which specializes in acquisition for the DPRK's defense industries and support for the DPRK's military-related overseas sales. Its procurements also likely support the DPRK's chemical weapons program.

b. *A.K.A.*: n/a

c. *Identifiers*: DOB: February 13, 1969; Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 472234895

7. KIM MUN CHOL

a. *Description*: Representative for Korea United Development Bank.

b. *A.K.A.*: Kim Mun-ch'o'l

c. *Identifiers*: DOB: March 25, 1957; Nationality: DPRK

8. KIM NAM UNG

a. *Description*: Representative for Ilsim International Bank, which is affiliated with the DPRK military and has a close relationship with the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation. Ilsim International Bank has attempted to evade United Nations sanctions.

b. *A.K.A.*: n/a

c. *Identifiers*: Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 654110043

9. PAK IL KYU

a. *Description*: Official for Korea Ryonbong General Corporation, which specializes in acquisition for DPRK's defense industries and support to Pyongyang's military-related sales. Its procurements also likely support the DPRK's chemical weapons program.

b. *A.K.A.*: Pak Il-Gyu

c. *Identifiers*: Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 563120235; Gender: male

List Update for Aliases

- JANG BOM SU (KPi.016) — *New AKA*: Jang Hyon U with date of birth 22 February 1958 and diplomatic passport number 836110034, which expires on 1 January 2020.
- JON MYONG GUK (KPi.018) — *New AKA*: Jon Yong Sang with date of birth 25 August 1976 and diplomatic passport number 836110035, which expires on 1 January 2020.

Annex II

Asset Freeze (Entities)

1. FOREIGN TRADE BANK (FTB)

   a. *Description*: Foreign Trade Bank is a state-owned bank and acts as the DPRK's primary foreign exchange bank and has provided key financial support to the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation.

   b. *AKA*: n/a

   c. *Location*: FTB Building, Jungsong-dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK

2. KOREAN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY (KNIC)

   a. *Description*: The Korean National Insurance Company is a DPRK financial and insurance company and is affiliated with Office 39.

   b. *AKA*: Korea Foreign Insurance Company

   c. *Location*: Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK

3. KORYO CREDIT DEVELOPMENT BANK

   a. *Description*: Koryo Credit Development Bank operates in the financial services industry in the DPRK's economy.

   b. *AKA*: Daesong Credit Development Bank; Koryo Global Credit Bank; Koryo Global Trust Bank

   c. *Location*: Pyongyang, DPRK

4. MANSUDAE OVERSEAS PROJECT GROUP OF COMPANIES

   a. *Description*: Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies engaged in, facilitated, or was responsible for the exportation of workers from the DPRK to other nations for construction-related activities including for statues and monuments to generate revenue for the Government of the DPRK or the Workers' Party of Korea. The Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies has been reported to conduct business in countries in Africa and Southeast Asia including Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Benin, Cambodia, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Malaysia, Mozambique, Madagascar, Namibia, Syria, Togo, and Zimbabwe.

   b. *AKA*: Mansudae Art Studio

   c. *Location*: Pyongyang, DPRK

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Identical letters dated 2 August 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

In numerous identical letters, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has informed the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council that the international coalition has savagely attacked innocent Syrian civilians and premeditatedly destroyed economic facilities and infrastructure in the Syrian Arab Republic. The members of the coalition have admitted in official statements that they have caused the killing and injury of thousands of Syrian children, women and elderly people with the pretext of combating terrorism. The illegal coalition's forces have also bombarded the positions of the Syrian Arab Army, whose officers and soldiers are the backbone of the fight against terrorism. Those attacks have killed and injured hundreds of heroes, who have laid down their lives to combat Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other terrorist organizations on behalf of all of the world's States.

In our most recent identical letters, dated 30 July 2017 (S/2017/655), we gave the Security Council detailed information regarding the crimes that the illegal coalition led by the United States of America has committed against civilians in a number of Syrian cities and villages, which have been reduced to a mass of blood and rubble strewn with the bodies of hundreds of Syrian civilians.

On 1 August 2017, international coalition aircraft carried out yet another massacre, killing no less than 60 civilians and injuring dozens more, most of whom were children, women and elderly persons. Missiles were fired at residential neighbourhoods and homes in the villages and towns of Kashm, Shuwayt, Duwayr and Asharah in Dayr al-Zawr governorate. Less than 48 hours earlier, coalition aircraft had carried out a similar massacre, bombarding the A'ishah hospital and civilians in the residential neighbourhoods of Nadi and Duwar al-Shuhada', in the city of Albu Kamal, killing six civilians and injuring dozens more, most of them women and children.

It has not been long since the Security Council and other United Nations entities adopted resolutions prohibiting all parties from targeting civilians, hospitals, schools and medical and food aid. Those resolutions call on all States to refrain from targeting such facilities. Why is the Security Council not holding the United States of America, and the coalition States in whose names these crimes were committed, responsible for what they have done to Syrian civilians, to hospitals, schools, bridges and dams, and to the channels that deliver water to civilians? These are the very crimes that the international community and the resolutions of the

Security Council have prohibited. Have the members of the coalition no shame, lying before the Security Council while their countries' aircraft kill civilians and bomb hospitals and schools?

The Syrian Arab Republic once again calls on the States members of the coalition to distance themselves from the crimes that the coalition has committed in their name, and promptly to dissolve the coalition. The latter is now fighting against the forces responsible for counter-terrorism, and it has killed innocent civilians and destroyed hospitals, schools and infrastructure that the Syrian people built over several decades with great sacrifices.

In order to combat terrorism, it is essential to respect international law, instead of burying international humanitarian law along with the bodies of innocent civilians and the rubble of the infrastructure that they had built. Syria reiterates that the coalition must be dissolved, as its actions complement those of the terrorist groups brutalizing and murdering the Syrian people.

In its previous identical letters, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has emphasized that the Security Council and the Secretary-General cannot remain silent about the coalition. Silence would only undermine trust in the United Nations, which was established to maintain international peace and security.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2017/676

Security Council

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4 August 2017

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Letter dated 4 August 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a chart detailing the violations of the ceasefire by the Sudan People's Liberation Army-North (SPLA-N) in Blue Nile State and South Kordofan State, during June 2017, as well as the violations of the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) in Central Darfur State (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Omer Dahab Fadl **Mohamed**
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 4 August 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

	Date	*State*	*Particulars of the violation*
1.	1 June 2017	South Kordofan	Four Sudan People's Liberation Army-North (SPLA-N) rebels attacked a herder and looted his cattle near the Kanjar area 9 km north-west of Dilling. The perpetrators came from Delib a SPLA-N camp and withdrew towards it.
2.	2 June 2017	Blue Nile	A force of SPLA-N rebels coming from Bulbulari area, looted 200 head of sheep and goats from nomads in the Talata Boyot area 4 km south-west of Daim Saad. The perpetrators withdrew towards the Bulbulari area.
3.	5 June 2017	South Kordofan	A force of SPLA-N rebels coming from the Kujoria area attacked the herders in the Gardod Sulaiman area, 35 km east of Elsunut, killing four herdsmen and injuring two.
4.	8 June 2017	South Kordofan	Seven SPLA-N rebels coming from the Abi area attacked the Aljami Mine and looted some belongings of the miners.
5.	11 June 2017	Blue Nile	A force of SPLA-N rebels detained three miners and looted their belongings. They also opened fire on a vehicle of the Ministry of Health bearing a United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) logo, between Dairang and Fadamiya, 50 km south of El Damazin. Two employees of the Ministry were injured. The attackers were chased by the security forces, who liberated one miner and killed one of the SPLA-N rebels.
6.	17 June 2017	Central Darfur	Four Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) rebels moved furtively into Naio village, west of Rockero, and injured a civilian in his house, through use of firearms.
7.	18 June 2017	Central Darfur	A force of SLA-AW rebels tried to loot cattle in the area west of Jebel Wisa, 3 km south-east of Galol, and injured one person.
8.	20 June 2017	South Kordofan	Four SPLA-N rebels moved furtively into the Tabaldiya area trying to loot cattle. They were repelled by the security forces in the area.
9.	21 June 2017	South Kordofan	A force of SPLA-N rebels looted 10 head of cattle in the Khor Shatta area. The security forces in the area chased them and exchanged fire with them. The perpetrators escaped and the cattle were restored.
10.	21 June 2017	South Kordofan	A force of SPLA-N rebels attacked a convoy of the Sudan Armed Forces, in an area located 15 km south of Dilling, with guns and a rocket-propelled grenade.
11.	21 June 2017	South Kordofan	A force of SPLA-N rebels looted 200 head of cattle and 50 head of goats in an area east of Kailak town. They moved towards the Korongo Abdalla area.
12.	28 June 2017	Blue Nile	A force of SPLA-N rebels attacked herders in the area 3 km east of the Bulang area. They were chased by the security forces. They moved towards Jebel Badaba, 10 km east of Dairang.
13.	28 June 2017	Blue Nile	Four SPLA-N rebels looted 120 heads of cattle from the Aradeek area, 10 km south-east of the Musfa area. They were chased by the security forces and withdrew towards Jebel Kudum, 10 km east of Bulang.

	Date	*State*	*Particulars of the violation*
14.	29 June 2017	Blue Nile	A force from SPLA-N attacked fellalla nomads coming from the Republic of South Sudan in the area between Ghabat Zarzora and Jaman Alghanam in the Republic of South Sudan. They looted 100 head of cattle from them.

United Nations S/2017/677

Security Council

Distr.: General
9 August 2017
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 4 August 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 1-2 and 4 August 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Nebenzia**

17-13722 (E) 100817 110817

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 4 August 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (1 August 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported eight incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: five in Aleppo, two in Damascus and one in Dar'a.

The Turkish representative office has reported four violations: two in Damascus governorate and two in Hama governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out six humanitarian operations in Aleppo governorate, where 7.3 tons of food products were delivered to the local population.

Humanitarian aid was provided to 2,291 people.

In total, 1,561 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian field medics have provided medical assistance to 222 people.

One United Nations humanitarian operation was carried out: the Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, 13 ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas: 7 in Idlib governorate and 6 in Aleppo governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 2,095.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs, Idlib and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 228.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (2 August 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported 17 incidents of gunfire: 16 in Aleppo governorate and 1 in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported five violations: four in Homs governorate and one in Damascus governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out four humanitarian operations, including:

- Three in Aleppo city, where 3.6 tons of water was delivered to the local population;
- One in Rawiyah in Hama governorate, where 2.6 tons of food products were delivered to the local population.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo was 6.2 tons.

Humanitarian aid was provided to 1,940 people.

In total, 1,565 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian field medics have provided medical assistance to 400 people.

One United Nations humanitarian operation was carried out: the Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is unchanged — it is still 2,095.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs, Idlib and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 228.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (4 August 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported four incidents of gunfire: three in Aleppo governorate and one in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported three violations in Damascus governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out seven humanitarian operations, including:

- Five in Aleppo city, where 1.4 tons of food was delivered to the local population;
- One in Dayr Hafir in Aleppo governorate, where 0.3 tons of food was delivered to the local population;
- One in Ladhiqiyah city, where 0.3 tons of food was delivered to the local population.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo was 2 tons.

Humanitarian aid was provided to 634 people.

In total, 1,576 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian field medics have provided medical assistance to 276 people.

One United Nations humanitarian operation was carried out: the Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is unchanged — it is still 2,131.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs, Idlib and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 228.

United Nations A/71/1013–S/2017/678

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
9 August 2017

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General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 68 (c)
Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 4 August 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the sentence of the occupation authority in the case of a citizen of Ukraine, Volodymyr Balukh (see annex).

I would appreciate your kind assistance in having the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 68 (c), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yuriy **Vitrenko**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

17-13720 (E) 150817

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 4 August 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the sentence of the occupation authority in the case of a citizen of Ukraine Volodymyr Balukh

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine expresses its categorical protest due to the sentence of pseudo-court of the Russian occupation regime in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in the case of a citizen of Ukraine Volodymyr Balukh.

Having convicted the Ukrainian citizen under the fabricated pretext to nearly 4 years of imprisonment solely for his conscious civil position and peaceful opposition to the illegal occupation of his native land, Russia once again demonstrated to the world its cynical disregard for human rights, freedoms and human life in general.

The Russian Federation, as the occupying state, has neglected the key provisions of international humanitarian law as well as demands of the UN General Assembly, set out in its resolution "Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)". Ukraine considers Volodymyr Baluch's case as another fact of violation by the Russian Federation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

We demand the Russian side to immediately abolish this inhumane and baseless judgement and cease any persecution of a citizen of Ukraine Volodymyr Balukh.

United Nations A/71/1015–S/2017/679

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
10 August 2017

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General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 31
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 4 August 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on another uncoordinated visit of the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukraine, by a Russian delegation led by the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev, on 4 August 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yuriy **Vitrenko**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

17-13842 (E) 140817

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 4 August 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on yet another uncoordinated visit of the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukraine, by a Russian delegation led by the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev, on 4 August 2017

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine expresses its strong protest against yet another visit uncoordinated with Ukraine of the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukraine, by a Russian delegation led by the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev, on 4 August 2017.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine has repeatedly emphasized the inadmissibility of visits by Russian officials of the sovereign territory of Ukraine in its internationally recognized borders, which include the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, without coordination with Ukraine.

Ukraine considers this and other similar so-called "visits" by Russian officials as a flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, a blatant and manifest disregard by the Russian Federation of universally recognized norms of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolutions 68/262 on the territorial integrity of Ukraine and 71/205 on the situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine), and obligations under bilateral and multilateral treaties to which the Russian Federation and Ukraine are parties.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine states that, according to the norms of international law, the Russian Federation, as the occupying State, its officials and the illegal "Crimean authorities" and their representatives who commit illegal acts and make illegal decisions bear full responsibility for those violations.

United Nations S/2017/680

Security Council

Distr.: General
7 August 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 4 August 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Further to my most recent report to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2017/591), dated 11 July 2017, I hereby request the Council to consider the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which is due to expire on 31 August 2017. In a letter dated 25 July 2017 addressed to me, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Emigrants of Lebanon requested the Council to extend the mandate for a further year, without amendment.

Further to Security Council resolution 2305 (2016), a strategic review of UNIFIL was conducted earlier in 2017. I communicated its conclusions and recommendations in a letter dated 8 March 2017 to the President of the Security Council (S/2017/202). The review took into account the evolving regional dynamics and internal context in Lebanon. The strategic priorities identified reflect a heightened emphasis on prevention, while ensuring that the necessary operational preparedness is in place for the worst-case scenario, in particular as it pertains to the mandate of UNIFIL regarding the protection of civilians. The review also identified efficiency gains that could be made without compromising the operational effectiveness of UNIFIL on land, in the air and at sea. The Force is implementing the recommendations and has adopted a proactive approach to achieving the efficiencies as a matter of priority.

The continued long period of relative calm and stability in southern Lebanon and along the Blue Line, as well as in northern Israel, is significant, especially in the light of the destabilizing developments in the region. I commend both the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces for their continued commitment in maintaining the cessation of hostilities and their close cooperation and coordination with UNIFIL.

The prevailing calm notwithstanding, there has been no tangible progress towards a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution to the conflict, as called for in resolution 1701 (2006). Both parties have yet to fulfil their respective obligations under the resolution. Israel must withdraw its forces from Lebanese territory and stop violations of Lebanese airspace. The Government of Lebanon must exercise effective authority over all Lebanese territory, prevent hostile action from its territory, ensure the safety and security of the civilian population, in addition to United Nations personnel, and ensure the disarmament of all armed groups so that there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State.

17-13448 (E) 080817

Please recycle

The Lebanese authorities should take all action to ensure that there are no unauthorized armed personnel, assets or weapons in the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River, bearing in mind the primary responsibility of the Lebanese Armed Forces in this regard. For its part, UNIFIL, in coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, remains determined to act with all means available within its mandate and capabilities on specific information provided regarding the illegal presence of armed personnel, weapons or infrastructure inside its area of operations. It is my intention to look at ways in which UNIFIL could enhance its efforts in this regard.

The cooperation between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces through strategic dialogue remains essential to assisting the Government of Lebanon to increase the capacity, capabilities and presence of the Lebanese Armed Forces in southern Lebanon and the territorial waters of Lebanon at an accelerated pace to fully implement the provisions of resolution 1701 (2006).

Mindful of the current regional context and the multiple security challenges confronting the Lebanese Armed Forces, I repeat my call for increased and targeted international support in this regard. The Lebanese Armed Forces have identified prioritized land and maritime capabilities, which were reflected in the strategic review, specifically: a "model brigade" in southern Lebanon; the acquisition of an offshore patrol vessel; and the establishment of a civil-military cooperation centre in the south. I strongly encourage the international community to support the identified needs of the Lebanese Armed Forces for the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and to coordinate with UNIFIL and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, within the framework of the International Support Group for Lebanon, on how best to mobilize such support. Having a strong and sustainable presence of the Lebanese Armed Forces in southern Lebanon is a vital element in enhancing the overall State presence in southern Lebanon and in moving from the fragile cessation of hostilities to a permanent ceasefire.

The liaison and coordination arrangements that UNIFIL has established with the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces, bilaterally and through the tripartite forum, remain a cornerstone for assisting the parties in finding mutually agreeable security arrangements and confidence-building measures to mitigate the scope for tension or incidents in sensitive areas along the Blue Line. I urge both parties to continue to actively engage with UNIFIL to maintain calm and prevent violations. I encourage the parties to continue to work with UNIFIL in the process to mark the Blue Line visibly on the ground in its entirety as a confidence-building measure, as well as to assist with the monitoring of violations and prevent inadvertent crossings and to find solutions for areas where agreement by the parties has not been reached to date.

The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continues to provide training to the naval branch of the Lebanese Armed Forces and to conduct maritime interdiction operations to prevent the unauthorized entry by sea of arms or related materiel into Lebanon. By enabling a safe and stable maritime environment, it contributes to maintaining the calm in Lebanon by deterring the use of Lebanese territorial waters for illicit purposes and mitigating the spillover effects of regional crises, as well as enhancing maritime trade in that part of the Mediterranean.

UNIFIL conducts, on average, 13,500 operational activities per month. Incidents of unfriendly or aggressive behaviour towards peacekeepers by the local population or obstruction of the freedom of movement of UNIFIL occasionally occur, but the number of such instances remains small. UNIFIL outreach activities and engagement with representatives of local-level and central-level government institutions support the extension of State authority and service provision to

communities in the south. In addition, the engagement of UNIFIL troops and international and national staff with the local population through civil-military cooperation activities and quick-impact projects continues to foster support among the local population and ensure that the mandate and activities of the Force are well understood.

The total number of military personnel, as at 24 July 2017, stood at 10,466. The UNIFIL civilian component numbered 235 international and 580 national staff. I am grateful to the 41 troop-contributing countries that make up UNIFIL for their ongoing commitment. The Force, through a wide range of operational and non-operational activities, continues to play a crucial role in maintaining stability in southern Lebanon and along the Blue Line and in creating an environment for a political process to take place with regard to a permanent ceasefire.

As the UNIFIL mandate approaches its expiration date, it is clear that more work remains to be done. In the absence of progress towards a permanent ceasefire, the ability of the Force to deter, prevent and deconflict will be increasingly put to the test. All efforts must therefore be expended to take advantage of the relative calm as a window of opportunity to make progress on outstanding elements of resolution 1701 (2006). In this regard, I call upon the parties to take the necessary positive steps towards a permanent ceasefire and long-term solution to the conflict as called for in resolution 1701 (2006). UNIFIL, in close coordination with the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator, is ready to lend its full support to the parties in this process.

I should like to express my appreciation to the Head of Mission and Force Commander of UNIFIL, Major General Michael Beary, and to all the military and civilian personnel of UNIFIL for the work that they are carrying out in southern Lebanon and for their commitment to the service of peace.

Regarding the financial aspects of UNIFIL, by its resolution 71/307 the General Assembly appropriated the amount of $483 million for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of the Force beyond 31 August 2017, the cost of maintaining UNIFIL would be limited to the amount approved by the Assembly.

As at 25 July 2017, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNIFIL amounted to $83.8 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $4,867.9 million. Reimbursement of troop costs has been made for the period up to 30 April 2017, while reimbursement of the costs of contingent-owned equipment has been made for the period up to 31 March 2017, in accordance with the quarterly schedule.

I should also like to express my appreciation for the unified and steadfast support of the Security Council to UNIFIL and its mandated activities. With the above information in mind, I recommend that the Council extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of 12 months, until 31 August 2018.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

United Nations S/2017/681

Security Council

Distr.: General
7 August 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 2 August 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), which was established by the Security Council in its resolution 1769 (2007). Its mandate was most recently extended in resolution 2363 (2017).

Following the usual consultations, I would like to inform you that it is my intention, as well as that of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, to appoint Lieutenant General Leonard Muriuki Ngondi (Kenya) as Force Commander of UNAMID.

Lieutenant General Ngondi succeeds Lieutenant General Frank Mushyo Kamanzi (Rwanda), who has been appointed as Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. Mr. Mahamat and I would like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to Lieutenant General Kamanzi for his dedication and effective leadership during his tenure in UNAMID.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

17-13449 (E) 080817

Please recycle

United Nations S/2017/682

Security Council

Distr.: General
7 August 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 4 August 2017 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 2 August 2017 (S/2017/681) concerning your intention, as well as that of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, to appoint Lieutenant General Leonard Muriuki Ngondi (Kenya) as Force Commander of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention expressed in your letter.

(*Signed*) Amr Abdellatif **Aboulatta**
President of the Security Council

17-13451 (E) 080817

Please recycle

United Nations S/2017/683

Security Council

Distr.: General
7 August 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 4 August 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2360 (2017), by which the Council decided to extend, until 1 August 2018, the mandate of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Accordingly, I wish to inform you that, after consulting the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I have appointed the following experts:

Mr. Zobel Behalal, natural resources/finance (Cameroon)
Mr. Ledio Cakaj, armed groups (Albania)
Ms. Virginie Monchy, humanitarian affairs (France)
Mr. Roberto Sollazzo, natural resources/finance (Italy)
Mr. Bart Vanthomme, armed groups (Belgium)
Mr. David Zounmenou, arms (Benin)

I have designated Mr. Behalal to serve as Coordinator of the Group.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

17-13452 (E) 080817

Please recycle

United Nations S/2017/684

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 August 2017
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 6 August 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I refer to our previous identical letters, the most recent of which were dated 2 August 2017 (S/2017/675), concerning the massacres of innocent Syrian civilians committed by the so-called international coalition led by the United States of America. In that connection, and on instructions from my Government, I wish to transmit the following information:

On Saturday, 5 August 2017, the warplanes of the so-called international coalition carried out yet another massacre, killing 43 civilians and injuring dozens more, most of them women, children and elderly people. The illegal coalition fired missiles at residential neighbourhoods and homes in Raqqah city. In a similar massacre only 24 hours before, on 4 August, its warplanes had bombarded the same city, killing eight civilians belonging to the same family. Seven of those killed were children; the eighth was a woman.

The international coalition led by the United States of America has targeted residential neighbourhoods and civilian homes, destroyed Raqqah national hospital and systematically used internationally prohibited white phosphorus. Those actions are a flagrant violation of international law and international humanitarian law. They are part of a series of crimes against Syrian civilians that the coalition has committed in Raqqah, Hasakah, Aleppo, Dayr al-Zawr and other Syrian cities.

The Syrian Arab Republic once again condemns in the strongest possible terms the crimes committed against Syrian civilians by the so-called international coalition. Those actions amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, and therefore cannot be justified under any pretext.

The Syrian Arab Republic again insists that this illegal coalition, which was established without the permission of the Syrian Government and outside the context of the United Nations, must be dissolved. The Security Council must fulfil its responsibility to maintain international peace and security and prevail on all States to enforce its counter-terrorism resolutions, particularly resolution 2253 (2015).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-13608 (E) 140817 140817

Please recycle

United Nations S/2017/685

Security Council

Distr.: General
7 August 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 7 August 2017 from the Ombudsperson addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to submit herewith the fourteenth report of the Office of the Ombudsperson, pursuant to paragraph 20 (c) of annex II to Security Council resolution 2368 (2017), according to which the Ombudsperson shall submit biannual reports to the Council summarizing her activities. The report describes the activities of the Office of the Ombudsperson in the period since the previous report was issued, covering the period from 24 January to 7 August 2017.

I would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Catherine **Marchi-Uhel**
Ombudsperson

17-13846 (E) 010917

Please recycle

Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson pursuant to Security Council resolution 2368 (2017)

I. Background

1. The present report provides an update on the activities undertaken by the Office of the Ombudsperson since the issuance of the thirteenth report of the Office (S/2017/60) on 23 January 2017.

II. Activities related to delisting cases

General

2. The primary activities of the Office of the Ombudsperson during the reporting period related to delisting requests submitted by individuals and entities.

Delisting cases

3. During the reporting period, one new case was submitted to the Office of the Ombudsperson and accepted. The total number of delisting petitions submitted to the Office since its establishment is 79 as at 7 August 2017. Unless the petitioner requests otherwise, all names remain confidential while under consideration and in the case of denial or withdrawal of a petition.

4. In total, the Ombudsperson has submitted 76 comprehensive reports[1] to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities since the Office was established. During the reporting period, she submitted eight reports and appeared before the Committee on five occasions to present nine cases.

5. Since the issuance of the thirteenth report, the names of three individuals have been retained and the names of six individuals have been delisted, through the Ombudsperson process.

6. Cumulatively, since the Office was established, 75 cases involving requests made to the Ombudsperson by an individual, an entity or a combination of the two have been resolved through the Ombudsperson process or through a separate decision of the Committee. In the 73 cases fully completed through the Ombudsperson process, 52 individuals and 28 entities have been delisted, one entity has been removed as an alias of a listed entity, and 16 delisting requests have been refused. In addition, three individuals were delisted by the Committee before the Ombudsperson process was completed and one petition was withdrawn following the submission of the comprehensive report. A description of the status of all of the cases, as at 7 August 2017, is contained in the annex to the present report.

7. There is currently one case pending before the Ombudsperson in the information-gathering phase and two cases pending before the Committee. The request submitted to the Office during the reporting period was presented by an

[1] This number includes one case concluded in 2011, in which the delisting request was withdrawn by the petitioner after the Ombudsperson had submitted and presented her report to the Committee. It also includes one case concluded in 2013, in which the Committee decided to delist the petitioner after the Ombudsperson had submitted her report to the Committee but before she had presented it to the same. This number does not include two additional cases concluded in 2013, in which the Ombudsperson case became moot following a decision by the Committee to delist the petitioners before the Ombudsperson had submitted her report.

individual. To date, in total, 71 of the 79 cases have been brought by individuals, two by an individual together with one or more entities and six by entities alone. In 39 of the 79 cases, the petitioner is or was assisted by legal counsel.

Gathering of information from States

8. In the new case, 10 requests for information have been sent so far, to nine States and one international organization. With respect to the eight cases for which a comprehensive report was submitted to the Committee during the reporting period, there were seven instances in which a State from which information had been requested failed to respond. In addition to the responses received from States to which requests were specifically directed, some Committee members provided information as a result of the general circulation of petitions.

9. During the reporting period, the Ombudsperson met on four occasions with officials in their capital to gather information directly on two specific cases. She also met with the authorities of one State in their capital to discuss broader issues relating to the Ombudsperson process.

10. In the reporting period, none of the designating States consulted during the information-gathering phase indicated that they do not object to delisting. Therefore, the Ombudsperson did not have recourse to paragraph 3 of annex II to resolution 2253 (2015) to shorten that phase.

Dialogue with the petitioner

11. During the period under review, with one exception discussed below, the Ombudsperson and her Office interacted with all petitioners during the dialogue phase of pending cases, including through written exchanges, telephone discussions and face-to-face interviews. During the reporting period, the Ombudsperson travelled to interview five petitioners in person.

Provision of comprehensive reports to interested States

12. In paragraph 13 of annex II to resolution 2368 (2017) it is stipulated that, if requested, the Ombudsperson may provide a copy of the comprehensive report to an interested State (designating State or State of nationality, residence or incorporation) with the approval of the Committee and any redactions needed to protect confidential material. In the reporting period, the Ombudsperson received seven requests for disclosure from States, six of which were approved by the Committee and one of which remains pending with the Committee at the time of this report.

Access to classified or confidential information

13. A formal agreement between Romania and the Office of the Ombudsperson for access to classified information was signed during the reporting period.[2] This brings the total number of agreements or arrangements to 19 with the existing agreement with Austria and 17 arrangements, with Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

14. Efforts have continued to expand the list of arrangements or agreements in this reporting period and it is hoped that further progress will be made in the coming

[2] The text of the agreement is available at www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/ombudsperson/classified_information. Article 13 (1) of the agreement contains the modalities for its entry into force.

months. One State has confirmed that it is willing to enter into an information-sharing agreement and a draft is currently being finalized by the authorities of that State following engagement by the Ombudsperson with the Permanent Mission of the State.

III. Summary of activities related to the development of the Office of the Ombudsperson

General

15. Activities to further develop and strengthen the Office of the Ombudsperson continued during the reporting period to the extent possible.

Outreach and publicizing of the Office

16. The Ombudsperson participated in some outreach activities, as far as possible given the limitations on time and resources.

17. On 24 April 2017, the Ombudsperson gave a briefing to the Constitutional Law Committee of the Parliament of Finland on the role of her Office in the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions regime. On 8 May 2017, the Ombudsperson provided an update on the status of cases in her office and discussed the following substantive issues in an open briefing to Member States: relevance of the Ombudsperson mechanism as seen from the practice of the General Court of the European Union; developments relating to reasons letters; and progress made in terms of informal arrangements with the Secretariat aimed at guaranteeing the independence of the Office. On 3 June 2017, the Ombudsperson participated in a workshop organized in Geneva by the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights. The experts consulted by the Special Rapporteur during the workshop discussed proposals he has put forward to the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly, namely, proposals for a United Nations registry for unilateral coercive measures and a United Nations declaration on unilateral coercive measures and the rule of law with a focus on redress and reparation. On 24 July 2017, the Ombudsperson briefed States members of the European Union on various aspects of the upcoming transition in the Office of the Ombudsperson, following her appointment on 3 July 2017 by the Secretary-General as Head of the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011.

Interaction with the Committee

18. Since 24 January 2017, the Ombudsperson has appeared before the Committee on six occasions. On 3 February 2017, she presented her report in one case in which the petitioner was retained on the list. On 1 March 2017, she presented her reports in the cases of Ata Abdoulaziz Rashid (delisted; formerly QDi.199) and Fadh Muhammad Abd al-Aziz al-Khashiban (delisted; formerly QDi.233). On 11 April 2017, she presented her reports in the cases of Dieman Abdulkadir Izzat (delisted; formerly QDi.200) and Fritz Martin Gelowicz (delisted; formerly QDi.259). On 19 May 2017, she presented her report in the case of Othman Deramchi (delisted; formerly QDi.164). On 13 July 2017 she presented her reports in two cases in which the petitioners were retained on the list and in the case of Adil Muhammad Mahmud Abd al-Khaliq (delisted; formerly QDi.255). On the latter occasion, in the light of her appointment as Head of the Mechanism relating to the Syrian Arab Republic, she also briefed the Committee on the transitional measures she recommended the

Committee to adopt to safeguard the rights of the petitioners who currently have a pending delisting request before the Ombudsperson. Further, on 7 August 2017, the Ombudsperson briefed the Committee on issues of confidentiality attaching to comprehensive reports.

19. As was previously the case, the Ombudsperson and staff supporting her Office have continued to engage regularly with the Coordinator and members of the Monitoring Team. The Monitoring Team has continued to provide relevant information in accordance with paragraph 4 of annex II to Security Council resolution 2368 (2017). During the reporting period, the Monitoring Team assisted the Office of the Ombudsperson in reviewing delisting requests and supporting materials which were in Arabic. The Team also helped the Office with German- and Arabic-language communication with petitioners.

Liaison with States, intergovernmental organizations, United Nations bodies and non-governmental organizations

20. The Ombudsperson and staff supporting her Office continued to interact with States during the reporting period, in particular States of relevance to the pending delisting petitions. In the reporting period they had several bilateral meetings with States interested in the work of the Office in order to discuss general issues, including issues related to possible options to increase the independence of the Office. The Ombudsperson continued discussions with a number of States concerning agreements or arrangements on access to confidential or classified information. She also maintained contacts with the informal Group of Like-Minded States on Targeted Sanctions.[3] The Ombudsperson also met with some State officials in their capitals for general discussions and to obtain information regarding particular cases. The Ombudsperson also approached the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the ICT for Peace Foundation to explore potential issues arising from possible partnerships with certain entities on the access to information.

Working methods and research

21. As in the past, casework in this reporting period involved open-source research to collect information relevant to delisting requests. The research capacity of the Office increased during this reporting period with the much-anticipated arrival of the new Research Assistant who joined the team in February 2017. She replaced the Administrative Assistant who had left at the beginning of the previous reporting period.

Website

22. The website of the Office of the Ombudsperson (www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/ombudsperson) has continued to be revised and updated.

[3] Comprising Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

IV. Observations and conclusions

Fairness and transparency of the process

Access to petitioners

23. During the dialogue phase, the Ombudsperson is required to meet with the petitioner, to the extent possible.[4] During the reporting period, the Ombudsperson approached the authorities of one of the designating States in the case of a detained petitioner with a view to exploring the possibility of meeting him in person. An in-person interview is in principle the best way to assess a petitioner's credibility and state of mind. Not only is such an assessment critical to determining whether he or she has engaged in a disassociation process, it is also important in cases where a petitioner has been detained for a significant period of time and no recent information on any activities in support of a listed entity is available.[5] In this particular case, moreover, in the light of the information gathered, an in-person interview would inevitably have generated an extensive number of topics, questions and follow-up questions. In this case there was no other opportunity for the petitioner to be heard.

24. The Ombudsperson had the opportunity to meet with the relevant authorities early in the process and to explain the importance of conducting an in-person interview in this particular case. However, without providing any reason, those authorities informally conveyed to the Ombudsperson that no in-person contact with the petitioner would be authorized in this case. Further, the Ombudsperson received no response to her repeated attempts to explore the possibility of providing the petitioner with an opportunity to be heard through another form of engagement with the Ombudsperson, whether through videoconference or even telephone. This complete lack of cooperation from the State in question with respect to access to the petitioner is all the more surprising as this State usually extends support and cooperation to the Office of the Ombudsperson. As no access to the petitioner was granted to the Ombudsperson, she had no choice but to meet with the petitioner's counsel instead. As a result, the Ombudsperson was unable to engage with the petitioner and directly assess the petitioner's current state of mind. The Ombudsperson based her analysis and recommendation on the information before her and submitted her report to the Committee. However, the petitioner in this case had no opportunity to know the case and respond to the information. As a result, the petitioner was not accorded all the elements of fairness envisaged under resolution 2368 (2017). The Ombudsperson raised her concerns in this respect with the Committee and proposed an exceptional measure to mitigate the fact that the petitioner did not get the opportunity to know the case against him. At the date of this report, the case remains pending before the Committee.

Reasons letters

25. Pursuant to the successive resolutions, the Ombudsperson is required to treat the content of her comprehensive reports as confidential. In her previous report the Ombudsperson pointed to the fact that the Committee had discontinued altogether its previously positive practice of providing increasingly substantive reasons letters to petitioners which included large excerpts of the Ombudsperson's analysis.[6] In the light of the importance of such letters for the transparency of the process and of its overall fairness (and perception thereof), the Ombudsperson expressed the hope that

[4] Resolution 2368 (2017), annex II, para. 7 (c).

[5] See S/2017/60, para. 32.

[6] Ibid., para. 28.

the Committee would revert to its earlier practice in this respect.[7] This was not the case during the reporting period. However, new language proposed by the Ombudsperson was introduced by the Security Council in paragraph 16 of annex II to resolution 2368 (2017). The Ombudsperson welcomes this change which, it is to be hoped, will put a halt to the recent practice of the Committee described below, and has thus the potential to increase the level of fairness of the review process.

26. According to the new language, in cases where the Committee follows the Ombudsperson's recommendation, the Ombudsperson submits to the Committee, for its review, a summary of the analysis contained in the comprehensive report. This follows the existing practice whereby in such cases, that is in all cases to date, the reasons contained in the Committee's letter were not the reasons of the Committee but rather a summary of the Ombudsperson's analysis contained in her comprehensive report. According to this practice, now formalized in annex II to resolution 2368 (2017), only a summary of the Ombudsperson's analysis, approved by the 15 members of the Committee, is disclosed to the petitioner. This summary is prepared by the Ombudsperson because she has the best understanding of the reasons contained in her own analysis and is thus best placed to assist the Committee with the preparation of its reasons letter.

27. According to new paragraph 16 of annex II, the purpose of the Committee's review is to address any security concerns, including to ascertain whether any information which is confidential to the Committee has been inadvertently included in the summary. This specification of the purpose of the Committee's review is important because of the unhelpful practice adopted by the Committee in the past year and especially during the reporting period. In a recent retention case for which the Ombudsperson's draft summary was already reduced to half the length of the analysis contained in the comprehensive report, the Ombudsperson was asked to perform further cuts so as not to exceed a set number of pages. The number of pages appeared to have been chosen arbitrarily and was meant to be applied equally in all cases. The process of "cutting for the sake of cutting" such summaries and imposing a maximum page limit was particularly intrusive. The Ombudsperson has no control over the "size" of a case, the amount of information gathered or the number of arguments raised by a petitioner. The Ombudsperson therefore needs to have leeway, in terms of the number of pages used, to capture a sufficient amount of the analysis for the summary to be a fair and transparent representation of the process. Such excessive cuts were contrary to the need for transparency which is at the core of the concept of fairness applied to sanctions. The reductions were problematic because they could lead to omitting responses to key arguments of the petitioner, or affect the logical sequence of reasoning underlying the recommendation, which would encroach on the Ombudsperson's independence.

28. The new paragraph 16 is in this respect particularly helpful. It recognizes that the summary must accurately describe the principal reasons for the recommendation of the Ombudsperson, as reflected in the analysis of the Ombudsperson. In cases where the listing is retained, the summary of the analysis must cover all of the arguments for delisting put forward by the petitioner to which the Ombudsperson responded. In cases of delisting, it further specifies that the summary must include the key points of the analysis of the Ombudsperson.

29. From the point of view of fairness and transparency, the ideal scenario would be one where the Ombudsperson would be the sole judge of the amount and content of reasons communicated to a petitioner in all cases where her recommendation is followed by the Committee. However, in the light of security interests at stake and of the sensitivity of some of the information shared with the Ombudsperson for

[7] Ibid., paras. 30 and 41.

inclusion in her comprehensive reports, the new language is a good compromise. The Ombudsperson welcomes the fact that the Security Council seized this opportunity to rectify a practice which was eroding the fragile fairness of the Ombudsperson process.

Delay in notifying the petitioner

30. The Ombudsperson is pleased to note that the new resolution allows her to immediately notify the petitioner when the Committee has followed her recommendation.[8] For reasons exposed in the tenth, eleventh and twelfth reports this was already the practice in delisting cases.[9] The new language formalizes this practice and, as proposed in those reports, extends it to situations of retention on the list. In addition, the deadline for the Committee to review the summary of the analysis contained in the comprehensive report and to convey these reasons to the Ombudsperson for onward transmission to the petitioner has been shortened from 60 to 30 days.

Cooperation of States and State support to the Office

31. States that are generally supportive of the Office of the Ombudsperson continued to express and demonstrate such support during the reporting period, with the exception of one State, as detailed above. During the previous reporting period, the Ombudsperson had stressed the importance of States responding to requests for information, even when they are not in a position to share relevant information in a specific request. These efforts have proved successful in part, as several States which had failed to respond previously to such requests did so during the reporting period. However, more efforts in this direction are needed.

Rehabilitation programme

32. During the reporting period, the Ombudsperson engaged in discussions on an initiative by Kuwait aimed at putting in place a one-year rehabilitation programme for listed nationals of that State, under the auspices of a government committee. The aim of the programme is to support the disassociation effort of individuals who admit to their prior actions, with a view to increasing their chances of being delisted from the sanctions list. Interesting features of the programme include a social integration plan, participation in lectures, adherence to certain rules in the use of social media, monthly meetings with representatives of the government committee, the opportunity for therapy and quarterly assessment by the government committee. For those individuals who, either during the course of the programme or following its completion, would request their delisting from the sanctions list via the Ombudsperson, Kuwait would be prepared to share the assessment reports on the progress of the participant with the Ombudsperson and, through him or her, with the Committee. The Ombudsperson welcomes this initiative and the fruitful cooperation with this State on this issue. She is hopeful that the programme will achieve the expected results and trusts that other States will be inspired to offer similar opportunities to their citizens.

Requirement of independence and impartiality and consideration of States' opinions

33. During the reporting period, several States expressed their perception and concern that the Ombudsperson may not be giving full consideration to the opinions expressed by States on particular delisting requests. These expressions of anxiety

[8] Resolution 2368 (2017), annex II, para. 16.

[9] See S/2015/533, para. 47, S/2016/96, para. 42, and S/2016/671, para. 31.

seem to reveal a recurring concern and a misunderstanding of the role and independence of the Ombudsperson. In fact, one State had highlighted this concern at the beginning of the Ombudsperson's tenure, before she had even issued her first comprehensive report. The dissatisfaction seems to emanate from cases where one or more States have expressed their opinion that the name of the petitioner should be retained on the sanctions list but where, on the basis of her assessment of the information gathered in the light of the applicable standard, the Ombudsperson ultimately recommended that the Committee consider delisting the name of the petitioner. States expressing such concerns and dissatisfaction were both members and non-members of the Committee. Some of those States submitted information relevant to the particular delisting request. In one case, the information did not support the position of the State. In other cases, States opposing a delisting request did not even submit information in support of their position.

34. Reviewing delisting requests is a very sensitive matter, involving security interests and human rights considerations. It is therefore to be expected that in a given case some States may disagree with the Ombudsperson's recommendation. The Ombudsperson is fully aware of her obligation to give serious consideration to the opinions of designating States and of other Member States that come forward with relevant information, in particular those Member States that are the most affected by the acts or associations that led to the original listing. The Ombudsperson has taken this requirement very seriously in each case where one or more States elected to offer an opinion on the merits of a delisting request.

35. However, those perceptions clearly reveal a lack of understanding of the way in which this requirement accords with the overall obligation of independence and impartiality which are at the core of the Ombudsperson process.

36. The Ombudsperson may not ignore the opinions of designating States, or those of other Member States that come forward with relevant information, in particular those Member States most affected by acts or associations that led to the original listing. The obligation to give serious consideration to those opinions is mandated in annex II to resolution 2368 (2017). The resolution makes equally clear that, in reviewing delisting requests, the Ombudsperson must act in an independent and impartial manner and neither seek nor receive instructions from any Government. These simultaneous requirements are fully compatible with each other and equally guide the Ombudsperson's approach in reviewing delisting requests.

37. The requirement to give serious consideration to the opinions expressed by States does not imply that the Ombudsperson should unconditionally follow such opinions. Such an interpretation would not only be unsustainable in the relatively frequent cases where the States which have expressed their opinion to the Ombudsperson about the delisting request diverge as to whether the listing should be maintained or terminated. It would also be incompatible with the requirement of independence and impartiality imposed on the Ombudsperson. The extent to which in a given case the Ombudsperson can follow the opinion expressed by a State depends on whether the opinion in question is sustained by the application of the standard to the totality of the information gathered in that case, and only to such information.

38. There are inevitably instances in which the Ombudsperson and one or more States choosing to express their opinion may diverge as to the merits of a delisting request. This is, first, because the Ombudsperson and the States in question do not necessarily have access to the same information. States do not always share with the Ombudsperson the information based on which they form their opinion, or the totality of it. The Ombudsperson may base her recommendation only on information before her and it would be improper for her to speculate on the existence and

content of information which a State has chosen not to share with her. Even when States make available the totality of the information based on which they have formed their opinion, they may not have access to the totality of the information gathered by the Ombudsperson. Through privileged dialogue with the petitioner, the Ombudsperson receives a unique perspective on the case. In addition, the Ombudsperson may receive confidential information from States or other sources, with a request not to share it with petitioners, States or even the Committee. In such cases, the Committee will not have access to information which may be determinative in recommending a delisting.

39. A difference of views on whether the delisting request should be granted may even exist in cases in which States and the Ombudsperson have had access to the same information. The Ombudsperson assesses whether there is sufficient information to constitute a reasonable and credible basis to maintain the listing at the time of review. Interaction with States, including Committee members, in the context of gathering information shows that when they form their opinion some States rely on their domestic standard, which may differ from the standard applied by the Ombudsperson. Other States do not rely on any standard at all and form their opinion based on considerations other than the present existence of an association with ISIL or Al-Qaida, the criterion for listing. Other divergences may arise from the fact that a State considers that sanctions should be punitive, rather than preventative, the purpose stated in Security Council resolutions. It may also stem from a State's particular understanding of the listing criteria and the notion of "association" and "disassociation". This interpretation does not always accord with the legal framework applicable to the sanctions regime.

40. The above divergences may lead one or more States to believe in a given case that the Ombudsperson has not sufficiently taken into account their opinion. To mitigate such a risk, the only tool at the disposal of the Ombudsperson is the care she applies in reasoning her recommendation in each case. The analysis and observations contained in the comprehensive report in principle contain sufficient explanations to inform the Committee why the Ombudsperson has not followed the opinion expressed by one or more States. However, owing to confidentiality constraints imposed by information providers, including States expressing an opinion, the Ombudsperson must omit from the comprehensive report information and analysis of the same which might otherwise be needed to fully disclose her reasoning. In addition, only a limited number of States that are not members of the Committee may, upon request and with the consent of the Committee, be provided with a copy of the comprehensive report.[10] Beyond that limited circle, States having expressed an opinion have no access to the comprehensive report even if they have provided relevant information to the Ombudsperson. Those States will therefore not have access to the Ombudsperson's reasoning.

Procedure and practices related to States' disagreement with recommendations

41. Resolution 2368 (2017) clearly lays down the procedure for handling the disagreement of one or more members of the Committee with a delisting recommendation by the Ombudsperson. Such a disagreement may materialize following one or more objections during the non-objection procedure envisaged by the Committee guidelines. The freeze of assets, travel ban and arms embargo will terminate with respect to the petitioner after 60 days, unless one of the two scenarios envisaged by paragraph 62 of the resolution occurs, namely, a reverse consensus or referral of the matter to the Security Council for its decision.

[10] According to resolution 2368 (2017), annex II, para. 13, these are a designating State, or State of nationality, residence or incorporation.

42. Resolution 2368 (2017) gives standing to States consulted by the Ombudsperson as relevant States to express their opinion to the Ombudsperson on whether the delisting request should be granted. Such standing is not limited to States that are members of the Committee. The resolution does not however give standing to States that are not members of the Committee to intervene in the latter's consideration of a delisting request. The Ombudsperson is authorized to inform the designating State(s), State(s) of residence, nationality or incorporation and any other relevant States of the recommendation only after the Committee has completed its consideration of the comprehensive report. Furthermore, it is only after such consideration that the Ombudsperson may, upon request by a designating State, or State of nationality, residence or incorporation, and with the approval of the Committee, provide a copy of the comprehensive report, with any redactions deemed necessary, to the requesting State.

43. Practice observed during the reporting period shows however, that some States find other ways than those authorized by the Security Council to be informed of the recommendation before the Committee has completed its consideration of the recommendation and to attempt to interfere in the process. It is not for the Ombudsperson to comment on the political and diplomatic character of the listing and delisting processes initiated by States, or on the practice of bilateral diplomatic negotiations and selective disclosure of intelligence among States which sometimes takes place in this context. Since the establishment of the Office of the Ombudsperson, the Security Council has repeatedly stated its commitment to continue to improve the fairness and transparency of sanctions procedures. It is the Ombudsperson's view that, in the context of a pending delisting request following a recommendation by the Ombudsperson, such practices are neither conducive to the fairness and transparency of the delisting process nor even compatible with it.

Confidentiality

44. In one case which concluded during the reporting period, the State of nationality, which is not a member of the Committee, obtained the watermarked version of a confidential comprehensive report of the Ombudsperson before the Committee had concluded its consideration of the same. As noted above, paragraph 13 of annex II to resolution 2368 (2017)[11] allows the Ombudsperson to provide a copy of that document, with any redactions deemed necessary by the Committee, to the designating State, or State of nationality, residence or incorporation. In the Ombudsperson's understanding, she may seek the Committee's approval to share a comprehensive report with those States, upon request, only after the Committee has completed its consideration of the same.[12] In this particular case, the State obtained a copy of the report before that time, and even before the Ombudsperson had sought the approval of the Committee to make it available to that State. The confidential report was thus shared without the Committee's approval, in violation of the resolution. After having obtained the comprehensive report without the approval of the Committee, the State of nationality in this case shared the unredacted version of report with counsel for the petitioner.

45. Such a practice raises concern and is unhelpful. It gives rise to concern because it suggests that the confidentiality attached to the documents is treated lightly. As a result, information which the Ombudsperson meant only for the

[11] This is the same text as paragraph 13 of annex II to resolution 2253 (2015).

[12] This understanding is based on the placement of paragraph 13 in annex II to resolution 2253 (2015), under "Committee discussion" and after paragraph 11, concerning the completion of the Committee's consideration of the comprehensive report, and paragraph 12, by which the Ombudsperson is required to notify all relevant States of the recommendation after the Committee has completed its consideration of the comprehensive report.

Committee may end up with States outside the Committee or, as in this case, with petitioners. This raises an obvious security concern. In addition, the timing of the disclosure of the Ombudsperson's comprehensive report to States outside the Committee is important. As noted above, in the Ombudsperson's understanding, the reports are meant to remain internal until the Committee has concluded its consideration of the matter. This provides a protection against interference in the Committee's work in instances in which certain actors may dislike the Ombudsperson's recommendation. Practices like the ones observed in the reporting period invite interference from States that should not be part of the decision-making process.

46. These practices are also unhelpful, because information providers share information based on an understanding or agreement with the Ombudsperson as to the addressees of this information. Until now, the Ombudsperson has been involved in the Committee's decision-making process with respect to the final destination of the information contained in her comprehensive reports by suggesting redactions of the same to the Committee. To date, the Committee has always implemented redactions proposed by the Ombudsperson. If the Ombudsperson is deprived of the opportunity to meaningfully participate in this process because unredacted versions of the report are leaked, she may no longer be able to guarantee the confidentiality of information to providers who request it. Alternatively, the Ombudsperson may lose the trust of those providers, who may become cautious or unwilling to share information with the Ombudsperson. As the Ombudsperson's work depends hugely on the ability to gather information, this is a very worrying prospect.

47. It is obvious from this example and the one mentioned in the previous section that some States consider that the Ombudsperson's comprehensive reports and recommendations should be shared outside the Committee. The Ombudsperson supports an approach which would provide more transparency to the process. Perhaps this occurrence could be used as a starting point for discussions on disclosing the comprehensive report of the Ombudsperson, with appropriate redactions, to interested States other than the ones listed in paragraph 13 to annex II of the resolution, the petitioner, and even the public, at the appropriate time. This would be a giant step towards a much-needed increase of transparency in this process. If the Ombudsperson were authorized to do this, she or he could prepare two versions of the comprehensive report. The Committee would receive a full version, while other States and the petitioners would ultimately receive a redacted version. Redactions would remove the names of sources such as the identity of States having provided information (unless the source agreed to its disclosure) and address any other security concerns which the information provider or the Committee may have. Redacted versions would be prepared by the Ombudsperson in consultation with the Chair and would have to be approved by the Committee.

Informal arrangements reinforcing the independence of the Office

48. The thirteenth report described the adoption of some informal arrangements by the Secretariat with a view to reinforcing the independence of the Office of the Ombudsperson.[13] In the same report the hope was expressed that the Secretariat could achieve further progress in relation to addressing the requirement of certification of service embedded in consultancy contracts, which covers both

[13] See S/2017/60, para. 36, referring to four informal measures: The views of the Ombudsperson will be taken into account in the performance appraisals of the staff supporting the Office; all recruitment processes for the staff supporting the Office will involve the Ombudsperson and her views will be taken into account; the Ombudsperson will have access to all material, including electronic drives, relevant to the work of the Office; and the Ombudsperson will have full editorial control of the Office website.

performance and attendance and is considered to be fundamentally inconsistent with the independent role and functions of the Ombudsperson.[14] I am pleased to report that this has been the case. If required, the output evaluation will be submitted only after the Ombudsperson has concluded her period of assignment and will make clear that such evaluation contains no substantive assessment of the Ombudsperson's work. The Ombudsperson understands that the Department of Political Affairs is also exploring the possibility of an additional step, which, if implemented, would remove any possible remaining concern regarding the appearance of independence of the Ombudsperson.

Transition

49. On 3 July 2017, the Secretary-General appointed the incumbent of the Ombudsperson position as Head of the Mechanism relating to the Syrian Arab Republic. In order to allow for her prompt transition into her new function, the Ombudsperson immediately prepared a plan containing transitional measures to safeguard the rights of the petitioners who currently have a pending delisting request before the Ombudsperson, or who submit such a request before the incoming Ombudsperson has taken up his or her duties. The Ombudsperson proposed these transitional measures to the Committee on 5 July 2017. One of the proposals was to include language in the new resolution to facilitate the transition process, including on the presentation of cases to the Committee by the Ombudsperson having prepared the comprehensive report in those cases. Another proposal would have allowed the extension of resolution deadlines in pending cases as a transitional measure. The Ombudsperson immediately engaged with Committee members to develop satisfactory resolution language, in the hope that the Security Council would see the value of the proposals and would adopt them. However, neither the proposals nor alternative transitional measures were adopted in the new resolution. It is hoped that in these circumstances the Committee will adapt its earlier practice developed in the context of the previous transition to allow the Ombudsperson to present her comprehensive reports to the Committee after the end of her mandate, even if the incoming Ombudsperson has yet to take office. There will also be a need for the Committee to adapt its practice to ensure that timelines are extended as needed in pending cases until the incoming Ombudsperson is in office. The Ombudsperson has left detailed instructions for the staff members supporting the Office of the Ombudsperson to ensure that the Office remains operational during the transition period. She hopes and trusts that the Committee and the Secretariat will extend their full cooperation and support to them so that they can maintain a functional office and prevent any undue delays in the consideration of delisting requests by the incoming Ombudsperson.

Conclusion

50. In the reporting period, the capacity of the Ombudsperson process to deliver fairness and transparency in an independent manner has again been put to the test. Within the limitations imposed by the resolution, varying degrees of cooperation of States, and a particularly strong climate of interference in this reporting period, the Ombudsperson has successfully upheld these values and maintained or even reinforced the credibility of the process. The Ombudsperson mechanism thus remains an important protection against arbitrariness.

51. In the two years since the appointment of the current Ombudsperson, the Office of the Ombudsperson has received 15 additional requests for delisting, bringing the total number of petitions received by this Office since it started

[14] See S/2017/60, para. 37.

operating seven years ago to 79. These numbers are a continuous credit to the effective implementation of the mandate, which has given it the reputation of a fair, independent and credible recourse. The fact that the mechanism is used confirms that the recourse it offers is a much-needed last link in the sanctions chain. Some States continue to act as if the requirements of impartiality and independence of the Ombudsperson were not the best guarantee of the effective implementation of sanctions, especially when they are personally concerned. However, the availability of such a trusted recourse undeniably strengthens the effectiveness of the sanctions measures by providing the guarantee to States which uphold the rule of law that the sanctions remain necessary and fair at any particular time.

52. There remain areas for improvement as outlined in this and previous reports. The overly strict limitations on transparency only serve to weaken the mechanism and to encourage violations of the confidentiality terms of the resolution. The best way to protect sensitive and justifiably confidential information may well be to scale back on those limitations and instead work towards a more open process with sufficient and appropriate disclosure of information, at the right time. In turn, limiting the disclosure of information to instances in which it really matters would allow the Committee to retain stricter control over such information.

53. As this is her last report to the Security Council in this position, the Ombudsperson expresses the hope that her successor will be appointed soon and will carry the torch in these important areas.

Annex

Status of cases

Case 1, one individual (Status: denied)

Date	*Description*
28 July 2010	Transmission of case 1 to the Committee
28 February 2011	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
10 May 2011	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
14 June 2011	Committee decision
1 September 2011	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 2, Safet Ekrem Durguti (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
30 September 2010	Transmission of case 2 to the Committee
26 April 2011	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
31 May 2011	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
14 June 2011	Committee decision to delist
12 August 2011	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 3, one entity (Status: delisting request withdrawn by petitioner)

Date	*Description*
3 November 2010	Transmission of case 3 to the Committee
14 June 2011	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
26 July 2011	Presentation of Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
2 August 2011	Withdrawal of petition

Case 4, Shafiq Ben Mohamed Ben Mohammed Al Ayadi (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
6 December 2010	Transmission of case 4 to the Committee
29 June 2011	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
26 July 2011	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
17 October 2011	Committee decision to delist
8 November 2011	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 5, Tarek Ben Al-Bechir Ben Amara Al-Charaabi (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
30 December 2010	Transmission of case 5 to the Committee
26 April 2011	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
31 May 2011	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
14 June 2011	Committee decision to delist
12 August 2011	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 6, Abdul Latif Saleh (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
14 January 2011	Transmission of case 6 to the Committee
17 June 2011	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
26 July 2011	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
19 August 2011	Committee decision to delist
8 November 2011	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 7, Abu Sufian Al-Salamabi Muhammed Ahmed Abd Al-Razziq (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
28 January 2011	Transmission of case 7 to the Committee
29 August 2011	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
15 November 2011	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
30 November 2011	Committee decision to delist
13 February 2012	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 8, Ahmed Ali Nur Jim'ale and 23 entities[a] (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
17 March 2011	Transmission of case 8 to the Committee
23 September 2011	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
13 December 2011	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
27 December 2011	Committee decision to delist six entities
21 February 2012	Committee decision to delist one individual and 17 entities
8 June 2012	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

[a] Barakaat North America, Inc., Barakat Computer Consulting, Barakat Consulting Group, Barakat Global Telephone Company, Barakat Post Express, Barakat Refreshment Company, Al Baraka Exchange, LLC, Barakaat Telecommunications Co. Somalia, Ltd., Barakaat Bank of Somalia, Barako Trading Company, LLC, Al-Barakaat, Al-Barakaat Bank, Al-Barakaat Bank of Somalia, Al-Barakat Finance Group, Al-Barakat Financial Holding Co., Al-Barakat Global Telecommunications, Al-Barakat Group of Companies Somalia Limited, Al-Barakat International, Al-Barakat Investments, Barakaat Group of Companies, Barakaat Red Sea Telecommunications, Barakat International Companies and Barakat Telecommunications Company Limited.

Case 9, Saad Rashed Mohammed Al-Faqih and Movement for Reform in Arabia (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
19 April 2011	Transmission of case 9 to the Committee
21 February 2012	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
17 April 2012	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
1 July 2012	Committee decision to delist
13 November 2012	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 10, Ibrahim Abdul Salam Mohamed Boyasseer (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
6 May 2011	Transmission of case 10 to the Committee
9 January 2012	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
1 March 2012	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
8 May 2012	Committee decision to delist
3 August 2012	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 11, Mondher ben Mohsen ben Ali al-Baazaoui (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
1 June 2011	Transmission of case 11 to the Committee
19 January 2012	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
1 March 2012	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
30 March 2012	Committee decision to delist
10 July 2012	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 12, Kamal ben Mohamed ben Ahmed Darraji (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
30 June 2011	Transmission of case 12 to the Committee
28 February 2012	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
3 April 2012	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
4 May 2012	Committee decision to delist
3 August 2012	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 13, Fondation Secours Mondial (Status: amended[a])

Date	*Description*
7 July 2011	Transmission of case 13 to the Committee
14 December 2011	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
24 January 2012	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
17 February 2012	Committee decision to amend
9 July 2012	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

[a] Amended to be removed as an alias of Global Relief Foundation (QE.G.91.02.).

Case 14, Sa'd Abdullah Hussein al-Sharif (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
20 July 2011	Transmission of case 14 to the Committee
29 February 2012	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
3 April 2012	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
27 April 2012	Committee decision to delist
5 June 2012	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 15, Fethi ben al-Rebei Absha Mnasri (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
4 August 2011	Transmission of case 15 to the Committee
9 March 2012	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
17 April 2012	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
2 May 2012	Committee decision to delist
3 August 2012	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 16, Mounir Ben Habib Ben al-Taher Jarraya (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
15 August 2011	Transmission of case 16 to the Committee
9 March 2012	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
17 April 2012	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
2 May 2012	Committee decision to delist
3 August 2012	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 17, Rachid Fettar (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
26 September 2011	Transmission of case 17 to the Committee
27 April 2012	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
5 June 2012	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
20 June 2012	Committee decision to delist
19 December 2012	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 18, Ali Mohamed El Heit (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
5 October 2011	Transmission of case 18 to the Committee
2 May 2012	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
3 July 2012	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
19 July 2012	Committee decision to delist
19 December 2012	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 19, Yassin Abdullah Kadi (listed as Yasin Abdullah Ezzedine Qadi) (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
16 November 2011	Transmission of case 19 to the Committee
11 July 2012	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
10 September 2012	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
5 October 2012	Committee decision to delist
25 August 2014	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 20, Chabaane ben Mohamed ben Mohamed al-Trabelsi (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
21 November 2011	Transmission of case 20 to the Committee
23 April 2012	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
5 June 2012	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
20 June 2012	Committee decision to delist
19 December 2012	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 21, Adel Abdul Jalil Ibrahim Batterjee (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
3 January 2012	Transmission of case 21 to the Committee
30 August 2012	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
6 November 2012	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
14 January 2013	Committee decision to delist
5 September 2013	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 22, Ibrahim ben Hedhili ben Mohamed al-Hamami (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
6 February 2012	Transmission of case 22 to the Committee
25 September 2012	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
6 November 2012	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
21 November 2012	Committee decision to delist
7 February 2013	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 23, Suliman Hamd Suleiman Al-Buthe (Status: delisted) (Repeated request)

Date	*Description*
23 February 2012	Transmission of case 23 to the Committee
9 October 2012	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
27 November 2012	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
10 February 2013	Committee decision to delist
30 August 2013	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 24, Mamoun Darkazanli (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
28 February 2012	Transmission of case 24 to the Committee
12 November 2012	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
8 January 2013	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
11 March 2013	Committee decision to delist
30 August 2013	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 25, Abdullahi Hussein Kahie (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
28 February 2012	Transmission of case 25 to the Committee
26 July 2012	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
10 September 2012	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
26 September 2012	Committee decision to delist
19 December 2012	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 26, Usama Muhammed Awad Bin Laden (Status: delisted) Ombudsperson case became moot following the Committee's decision of 21 February 2013

Date	*Description*
23 April 2012	Transmission of case 26 to the Committee
15 February 2013	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
21 February 2013	Committee decision to delist

Case 27, one individual (Status: denied)

Date	*Description*
7 May 2012	Transmission of case 27 to the Committee
11 February 2013	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
7 May 2013	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
7 May 2013	Committee decision to retain listing
12 June 2013	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 28, one individual (Status: denied)

Date	*Description*
7 June 2012	Transmission of case 28 to the Committee
20 November 2012	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
8 January 2013	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
8 January 2013	Committee decision to retain listing
29 January 2013	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 29, Muhammad ʻAbdallah Salih Sughayr (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
25 July 2012	Transmission of case 29 to the Committee
9 April 2013	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
21 May 2013	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
20 July 2013	Committee decision to delist
25 August 2014	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 30, Lajnat Al Daawa Al Islamiya (LDI) (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
25 July 2012	Transmission of case 30 to the Committee
15 April 2013	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
2 July 2013	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
3 September 2013	Committee decision to delist
25 August 2014	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 31, Abd al Hamid Sulaiman Muhammed al-Mujil (Status: delisted)

Date	Description
1 August 2012	Transmission of case 31 to the Committee
13 March 2013	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
30 April 2013	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
30 June 2013	Committee decision to delist
25 August 2014	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 32, Mohamed ben Mohamed ben Khalifa Abdelhedi (Status: delisted)

Date	Description
19 September 2012	Transmission of case 32 to the Committee
5 March 2013	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
16 April 2013	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
1 May 2013	Committee decision to delist

Case 33, Mohammed Daki (Status: delisted)

Date	Description
12 October 2012	Transmission of case 33 to the Committee
28 May 2013	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
30 July 2013	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
16 August 2013	Committee decision to delist
25 August 2014	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 34, Abdelghani Mzoudi (Status: delisted)
Ombudsperson case became moot following the Committee's decision of 18 March 2013

Date	Description
8 November 2012	Transmission of case 34 to the Committee
18 March 2013	Committee decision to delist

Case 35, International Islamic Relief Organization, Philippines, Branch Offices (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
13 December 2012	Transmission of case 35 to the Committee
5 September 2013	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
1 November 2013	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
3 January 2014	Committee decision to delist
25 August 2014	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 36, International Islamic Relief Organization, Indonesia, Branch Offices (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
13 December 2012	Transmission of case 36 to the Committee
5 September 2013	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
1 November 2013	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
3 January 2014	Committee decision to delist
25 August 2014	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 37, Jaber Abdullah Jaber Ahmed Al-Jalahmah (Status: delisted)[c]

Date	*Description*
4 February 2013	Transmission of case 37 to the Committee
5 September 2013	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
1 November 2013	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
3 January 2014	Committee decision to delist
25 August 2014	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

[c] Jaber Abdullah Jaber Ahmed Al-Jalahmah was re-listed on the same date by a separate Committee decision.

Case 38, Moustafa Abbas (listed as Moustafa Abbes) (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
13 February 2013	Transmission of case 38 to the Committee
12 August 2013	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
13 September 2013	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
30 September 2013	Committee decision to delist
25 August 2014	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 39, Atilla Selek (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
13 February 2013	Transmission of case 39 to the Committee
2 October 2013	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
13 December 2013	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
31 December 2013	Committee decision to delist
25 August 2014	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 40, Youssef ben Abdul Baki Ben Youcef Abdaoui (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
4 March 2013	Transmission of case 40 to the Committee
14 November 2013	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
11 February 2014	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
14 April 2014	Committee decision to delist
25 August 2014	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 41, L'hadi Bendebka (listed as Abdelhadi Ben Debka) (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
12 March 2013	Transmission of case 41 to the Committee
14 October 2013	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
3 December 2013	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
18 December 2013	Committee decision to delist
25 August 2014	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 42, Youcef Abbas (listed as Youcef Abbes (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
4 March 2013	Transmission of case 42 to the Committee
2 October 2013	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
15 November 2013	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
3 December 2013	Committee decision to delist
25 August 2014	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 43, Said Yousef AbouAziz (listed as Said Youssef Ali Abu Aziza) (Status: delisted)
Ombudsperson case became moot following the Committee's decision of 26 August 2013

Date	*Description*
27 March 2013	Transmission of case 43 to the Committee
26 August 2013	Committee decision to delist

Case 44, one individual (Status: denied)

Date	*Description*
2 May 2013	Transmission of case 44 to the Committee
4 February 2014	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
21 April 2014	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
21 April 2014	Committee decision to retain listing
30 July 2014	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 45, one individual (Status: denied)

Date	*Description*
6 May 2013	Transmission of case 45 to the Committee
9 December 2013	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
11 February 2014	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
11 February 2014	Committee decision to retain listing
17 March 2014	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 46, Yacine Ahmed Nacer (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
10 May 2013	Transmission of case 46 to the Committee
30 December 2013	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
25 February 2014	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
13 March 2014	Committee decision to delist
25 August 2014	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 47, Nabil Benatia (listed as Nabil ben Mohamed ben Ali ben Attia) (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
3 June 2013	Transmission of case 47 to the Committee
12 November 2013	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
13 December 2013	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
31 December 2013	Committee decision to delist
25 August 2014	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 48, Wael Hamzah Jelaidan (listed as Wa'el Hamza Abd al-Fatah Julaidan) (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
17 June 2013	Transmission of case 48 to the Committee
19 March 2014	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
24 June 2014	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
25 August 2014	Committee decision to delist
29 October 2014	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 49, one individual (Status: denied)

Date	*Description*
24 June 2013	Transmission of case 49 to the Committee
4 April 2014	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
24 June 2014	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
24 June 2014	Committee decision to retain listing
10 September 2014	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 50, Al-Haramain Foundation (USA) (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
5 September 2013	Transmission of case 50 to the Committee
30 June 2014	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
26 August 2014	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
25 October 2014	Committee decision to delist
29 December 2014	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 51, Aqeel Abdulaziz Aqeel Al-Aqeel (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
28 October 2013	Transmission of case 51 to the Committee
18 August 2014	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
31 October 2014	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
2 January 2015	Committee decision to delist
3 March 2015	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 52, one individual (Status: denied)

Date	*Description*
27 May 2014	Transmission of case 52 to the Committee
18 February 2015	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
14 April 2015	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
14 April 2015	Committee decision to retain listing
10 June 2015	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 53, Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Jaffar 'Ali (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
13 June 2014	Transmission of case 53 to the Committee
9 December 2014	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
29 January 2015	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
31 March 2015	Committee decision to delist
12 May 2015	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 54, Abdul Rahim Hammad Ahmad al-Talhi (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
19 June 2014	Transmission of case 54 to the Committee
29 January 2015	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
17 March 2015	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
17 May 2015	Committee decision to delist
22 July 2015	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 55, Ismail Mohamed Ismail Abu Shaweesh (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
23 June 2014	Transmission of case 55 to the Committee
10 November 2014	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
16 December 2014	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
2 January 2015	Committee decision to delist
17 February 2015	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 56, one individual (Status: denied) (Repeated request)

Date	*Description*
5 September 2014	Transmission of case 56 to the Committee
21 April 2015	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
19 June 2015	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
19 June 2015	Committee decision to retain listing
10 July 2015	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 57, one individual (Status: denied) (Repeated request)

Date	*Description*
9 September 2014	Transmission of case 57 to the Committee
8 June 2015	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
27 July 2015	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
27 July 2015	Committee decision to retain listing
20 August 2015	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 58, one individual (Status: denied)

Date	*Description*
30 August 2014	Transmission of case 58 to the Committee
29 June 2015	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
24 August 2015	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
24 August 2015	Committee decision to retain listing
30 October 2015	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 59, Al Sayyid Ahmed Fathi Hussein Eliwah (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
30 September 2014	Transmission of case 59 to the Committee
12 May 2015	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
19 June 2015	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
18 August 2015	Committee decision to delist
2 September 2015	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 60, Mohammed Ahmed Shawki al Islambolly (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
10 November 2014	Transmission of case 60 to the Committee
13 July 2015	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
24 August 2015	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
26 October 2015	Committee decision to delist
27 October 2015	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 61, Yasser Mohamed Ismail Abu Shaweesh (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
19 January 2015	Transmission of case 61 to the Committee
7 July 2015	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
24 August 2015	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
9 September 2015	Committee decision to delist
6 November 2015	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 62, Abd al Wahab Abd al Hafiz (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
11 March 2015	Transmission of case 62 to the Committee
9 November 2015	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
23 December 2015	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
11 January 2016	Committee decision to delist
22 January 2016	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 63, one individual (Status: denied)

Date	*Description*
12 March 2015	Transmission of case 63 to the Committee
10 November 2015	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
23 December 2015	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
23 December 2015	Committee decision to retain listing
12 January 2016	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 64, one individual (Status: denied)

Date	*Description*
29 May 2015	Transmission of case 64 to the Committee
25 February 2016	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
20 April 2016	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
20 April 2016	Committee decision to retain listing
9 June 2016	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 65, Farid Aider (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
27 August 2015	Transmission of case 65 to the Committee
26 February 2016	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
20 April 2016	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
20 June 2016	Committee decision to delist
20 June 2016	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 66, one individual (Status: denied)

Date	*Description*
15 October 2015	Transmission of case 66 to the Committee
15 June 2016	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
8 August 2016	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
8 August 2016	Committee decision to retain listing
23 September 2016	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 67, Daniel Martin Schneider (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
3 February 2016	Transmission of case 67 to the Committee
29 April 2016	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
17 June 2016	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
5 July 2016	Committee decision to delist
22 August 2016	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 68, one individual (Status: denied)

Date	*Description*
22 March 2016	Transmission of case 68 to the Committee
23 November 2016	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
3 February 2017	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
3 February 2017	Committee decision to retain listing
5 April 2017	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 69, Ata Abdoulaziz Rashid (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
8 June 2016	Transmission of case 69 to the Committee
30 December 2016	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
1 March 2017	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
1 May 2017	Committee decision to delist
19 May 2017	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 70, Fahd Muhammad Abd al-Aziz al-Khashiban (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
12 July 2016	Transmission of case 70 to the Committee
16 January 2017	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
1 March 2017	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
16 March 2017	Committee decision to delist
27 March 2017	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 71, Othman Deramchi (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
3 August 2016	Transmission of case 71 to the Committee
6 April 2017	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
19 May 2017	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
20 July 2017	Committee decision to delist
1 August 2017	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 72, Dieman Abdulkadir Izzat (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
9 September 2016	Transmission of case 72 to the Committee
27 February 2017	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
11 April 2017	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
28 April 2017	Committee decision to delist
9 May 2017	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 73, one individual (Status: denied)

Date	*Description*
23 September 2016	Transmission of case 73 to the Committee
11 May 2017	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
13 July 2017	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
13 July 2017	Committee decision to retain listing
26 July 2017	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 74, Fritz Martin Gelowicz (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
17 October 2016	Transmission of case 72 to the Committee
7 March 2017	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
11 April 2017	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
28 April 2017	Committee decision to delist
9 May 2017	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 75, one individual (Status: denied)

Date	*Description*
17 November 2016	Transmission of case 75 to the Committee
17 May 2017	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
13 July 2017	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
13 July 2017	Committee decision to retain listing
26 July 2017	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 76, one individual (Status: Committee phase)

Date	*Description*
22 November 2016	Transmission of case 76 to the Committee
19 July 2017	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee

Case 77, Adil Muhammad Mahmud Abd al-Khaliq (Status: delisted)

Date	*Description*
28 November 2016	Transmission of case 77 to the Committee
24 May 2017	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee
13 July 2017	Presentation of the Comprehensive Report by the Ombudsperson to the Committee
28 July 2017	Committee decision to delist
7 August 2017	Formal notification to petitioner with reasons

Case 78, one individual (Status: Committee phase)

Date	*Description*
7 December 2016	Transmission of case 78 to the Committee
7 August 2017	Comprehensive report submitted to the Committee

Case 79, one individual (Status: Information-gathering phase)

Date	*Description*
27 March 2017	Transmission of case 79 to the Committee
27 November 2017	Deadline for completion of the Information-gathering phase